Using estimates of protection in the EU market against US exports, this paper illustrates the relative importance of natural and policy sources of protection and the measurement errors induced in the measurement of effective protection by omitting transactions costs. It also considers protection in the EU 'domestic' and export market, and the implications of the elimination of tariff barriers only on relative rates of protection in 'domestic' and export markets.
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Non-Technical Summary
Most work on the nature and extent of barriers to international trade concentrates on policy barriers, in particular tariffs and non-tariff border interventions by policy makers. These barriers are now low or have been eliminated completely by regional (e.g. EU) and multilateral agreements (GATT 'rounds'), and will decline further as current and future commitments are implemented. Since these declines in policy barriers are often viewed by trade economists as major contributory factors in the growth in world trade, then one might anticipate that the scope for further growth in world trade is restricted. But this interpretation of trade prospects fails to take appropriate account of another important source of trade barrier, namely so-called "natural" barriers associated with the costs of transacting internationally. An important element of these is the cost of transporting goods internationally, by land, air or sea. Ironically it is often popularly believed that technological improvements in the transportation sector (e.g. containerisation) have substantially reduced the cost of transacting internationally, and may therefore have been at least as important as policy liberalisation in stimulating the growth of world trade. However, recent work, including this paper, challenges the view that 'natural' barriers have fallen significantly. Indeed, the paper shows that transport costs now in general pose a markedly greater barrier to trade than tariffs. In nominal terms the simple average EU tariff on manufactured imports from the US is less than 5% (and will fall further once all the Uruguay Round Commitments are implemented), while the average rate of international transportation cost (i.e. nominal 'protection' rate) on these same imports is 8%. The divergences between the nominal protection rates between policy and natural barriers are of course even greater than this in some manufacturing sectors. More importantly both of these barriers apply on both competing final imports and on intermediate importable imports. In which case there are likely to marked differences between the effective rates of protection arising from policy barriers alone and those arising from policy and natural barriers combined. The paper illustrates these differences with estimates of effective rates of protection for EU manufacturing sectors for each source of barrier and when combined. It is clear that measuring effective protection for policy barriers alone is in general misleading; giving rise to measurement errors and to misrepresentation of the relative pattern of incentives to produce for local as opposed to export markets. Where tools of analysis such as effective protection are used to comment on trade issues they should not, as they often do, omit natural barriers. There may be considerable scope for promoting world trade by lowering 'natural' barriers.
Introduction
There is a large empirical literature on the measurement of effective protection.
1 Most recent work has been inspired by pressures for trade liberalisation, and the resulting desire to measure pre-reform and post-reform protection. 2 The focus has been almost exclusively on policy induced rather than natural barriers to trade. 3 But the low level of policy barriers in many industrialised countries may now mean that transactions costs are likely to be at least as important as trade policy-induced price effects. Moreover, implementation of Uruguay Round tariff reductions and commitments to further liberalisation will only intensify this.
The purpose of this paper twofold: first to compare the relative magnitudes of natural and policy based sources of effective protection; second, to estimate the potential measurement error induced when natural barriers are ignored. Our focus is protection against US export into the EU.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the prevailing evidence on the relative importance of trade policy and natural barriers. Section 3 sets up a simple model of effective protection in the home market which allows for both policy and natural barriers and identifies sources of measurement error associated with a model that omits the latter. Relative magnitudes of natural and policy barriers and potential measurement error associated with exclusion of natural barriers are illustrated in Section 4, with evidence for EU protection against manufactured imports from the US. The analysis is extended in Section 5 to allow for export sales, and the comparison of relative protection in home and export markets. Section 6 reports on estimation of relative rates of protection in EU and export markets in competition with US producers, and on the implications of a zero tariff option being implemented. Finally the conclusions and implications of the analysis are set out in Section 7. inland charges. He further shows that freight rates were substantially higher than tariff rates in the US for most manufactured goods.
The primary purpose of the present paper is to explore the implications of omitting 'natural'
barriers from the measurement of protection, rather than provide precise and comprehensive measures of different types of and of total levels of 'natural' protection. It is clear however, from the information in figure 1 , that the evidence for the EU is in line with that identified by other authors for the US; for 10 of the 16 manufacturing sectors the nominal rate of natural protection exceeds the average (nominal) tariff for that sector. (The nature and source of this information is discussed in section 4.)
A simple model of effective protection
Take a small country and homogenous good, where the cost of any barrier is borne wholly by the importing country. The final good j uses a fixed technology of v units of a single, intermediate importable good i, where the world prices of each are respectively P j and P i .
Thus the value share (a ij ) of i in the production of j at world prices is:
The introduction of a tariff (t j ) and transaction frictions to trade means that the technological coefficient at actual distorted prices ) a ( ij ′ can be written as: The frictionless technological coefficient has therefore to be estimated ) â ( j i from the observed, distorted coefficient as follows: Consider now the measurement of effective protection (e j ), which is defined as:
where V j = value added in activity j or net price of final product j at frictionless world prices / j V = value added in activity j at distorted domestic prices
In the single input case, maintaining our earlier assumptions, then:
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) and reducing gives us the following expression for the effective rate of protection for import competing production of j:
Thus there are three broad sources of potential measurement error associated with the estimation of effective rates of protection; error in measuring nominal output protection
and error in estimating the technical coefficient (a ij ).
If we rewrite eq. (7) 
Effective protection in the EU Market
To illustrate the measurement error associated with omitting natural barriers from the calculation of effective protection we take the case of barriers facing US manufactured exports into EU markets. Estimates of policy and natural barriers are taken from the GTAP database (Hertel, 1997) for fourteen manufacturing sectors. 7 The technological coefficients are also taken from the same source. 8 This base data which is set out in Table 1 Overall rates of effective protection ) e ( j , corresponding to the nominal data in Table 1 and estimated using (7), are reported in table 2. The unweighted average across sectors is 10.4%, with a range of -2.7% to +22%. By contrast the distorted ) e ( * j or policy-only measure (where j Π and i Π are incorrectly assumed to be zero) has an average value of only 2.6%, and range of -5.8% to +19.7%. The ranking of specific industries is also affected in a non-trivial manner in the move from the policy-only to the total measure of effective protection. Textiles and fabricated metal products for example both fall six places in the rank order, as their relative level of measured effective protection falls. The absolute divergences are also quite marked, and this is no doubt of relevance to both the specific sector and to those negotiating trade reforms relating to that sector. In the case of 'chemicals, rubber and plastics' for instance the distorted, policy-only measure is over 23
percentage points less than the complete measure. Indeed there are four sectors where the distorted measure is at least 10 percentage points too small, while there are two sectors 'fabricated metal products' and 'other manufactures' where the complete measure falls in absolute terms relative to the distorted measure. 
Extending the analysis to allow for exports
The model set out in Section 2 can be viewed either as representing the importables only case (all sales of a product going to the home market) or as providing a measure of protection in the home market only where the product is exportable. In practice, in multiproduct sectors with sales in both home and export markets, the average rate of effective protection ( ) 
where m w = share of domestic sales in total sales
The term m e is calculated using equation 7; policy and natural barriers or competing final imports tending to increase effective protection in domestic sales, with policy and natural barriers against importable intermediate imports tending to reduce effective protection.
Effective protection in export sales is not however appropriately represented by (7). Tariffs (or any policy barrier against final imports) do not protect production destined for export markets, ie the terms j t and j Π j t are unambiguously zero. Natural barriers affect importation and exportation however. Although the incidence of the barrier or implicit tax between producers and consumers may differ between the importables and exportables case, we assume here that the tax is born by exporters. 11 We need to reverse the sign on 
Effective protection in EU-US trade and trade regime bias
Section 3 has already reported on levels of effective protection in the EU market against US imports. Table 3 includes the results from table 2 e it is over three times higher in absolute terms at -24.1%.
The consistent 'taxing' effect of policy and natural barriers is evident in the estimates in Table 3 . Both N x e and P x e are negative in every sector. Since tariffs on final goods can only 'subsidise' importables production, then P x e can only be zero or negative. Given positive nominal import tariffs, the sectoral rates are shown to range from -11.9% (leather etc) to -3.1% (petroleum and coal products) and to average -6.8%. Since natural barriers against imports into exports on final exports cannot be avoided, N x e can only be negative.
The results confirm this; ranging from -40.1% in (chemicals) to -13.1% in (textiles). is set out by sector in Table 4 . Currently it is 42.5%, and ranges from 15.6%
(other manufacturers) to 96.3% (chemicals etc). There is clearly an opportunity to promote extra-EU exports by reducing this anti-export bias induced by natural and policy barriers.
Indeed the bias is now presumably lower than it has been in the past, because GATT Rounds have progressively brought down policy barriers over the last forty years. Our estimates suggest however that the scope for further lowering the bias through tariff liberalisation is limited. Table 4 . This is equivalent to considering a future tariff negotiation that resulted in the elimination of EU tariffs.
Although the differential or trade regime bias measure falls consistently (with the average falling from 42.5% to 31.9%), it remains relatively large. In other words it is natural, rather than policy, barriers that are the major, current source of bias against extra-regional exports by the EU. 
Conclusions
This paper shows that there may be significant measurement error if policy sources only are incorporated into the effective protection modelling framework. Indeed, the present work is at a relatively aggregated ( 1 For developed countries see Baldwin (1984) and Greenaway and Milner (1993) for developing countries. 2 There is a literature that is critical of the use of the effective protection tool (e.g. Anderson, 1970 , Ethier, 1977 , in particular as a guide to general equilibrium output effects. The present focus is on measurement rather than interpretation issues, though there are theoretical contributions that emphasis the potential use of effective protection in analysing distributional effects (e.g. Jones, 1975 and Anderson, 1998) . 3 There is earlier, but limited, work in this area by inter alia, Waters (1970) , Yeats and Finger (1976) and Clark (1981) . 4 There is evidence for earlier periods of falling international transportation costs. For example Harley (1988 Harley ( , 1989 for the period 1850-1913, when world trade also grew quickly. 5 For simplicity a constant cost technology is assumed for transacting internationally. We are also assuming that import duties are charged on the transaction-inclusive (i.e. cif) value of imports. In the case of fob valuation for tariffs the term m t Π disappears, but the value of the estimated coefficient ) â ( ij still depends on the level and pattern of natural as well as policy barriers. 6 The inequality is likely to hold also where there are multiple inputs or the final good is an exportable. The transaction costs of importing intermediate goods originating from one set of countries are likely to be quite different to the transactions costs of exporting the final good to a potentially different set of destination countries. Although the interactive term in equation 9 ( ) I j e disappears if tariffs are charged on the fob value, the possibility of distorting the measurement of effective protection by using distorted estimates of technical co-efficient remains. 7 These are based on cif-fob comparisons of trade valuation and likely to be lower range or downwardly biased estimates for a number of reasons. They are likely to exclude certain additional transactions costs or barriers that apply to internationally rather than domestically supplied goods e.g. certification and internal transfers. Since they are trade-weighted measures they are also perversely weighted, with no or reduced weights applying to trade driven out by natural barriers. 8 For expositional and presentational convenience we retain the single input model for estimation purposes. The total share of importable intermediate inputs in the total value of output in each sector is taken as the share of a single composite input subject to the trade-weighted average rate of either tariff or transaction cost on imported inputs into the sector from all sources. 9 Weighted by the value of US final imports competing with this sector. Note that this excludes non-tariff barriers and therefore may downwardly bias protection in some sectors. Non-tariff barriers tend to be used by the EU against other countries than the US. 10 This may upwardly bias the rate of input taxation on EU production competing with US imports as a result of product and source aggregation effects. 11 This is consistent with a small country assumption on both the importables and exportables side. To the extent that it is inappropriate in the subsequent empirical application in this paper, we should view that estimates as providing upper bounds on the protecting or taxing effects of natural barriers. 11 For expositional convenience we assume that the distortionless estimate of the technological coefficient ( ) ij â is still as given by eq (3). 12 For expositional convenience we assume that the distortionless estimate of the technological coefficient ( ) ij â is still as given by eq (3).
